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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates whether CEO supplemental executive retirement plans
(SERPs) are associated with firm risk. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) show that CEOs
manage their firms more conservatively as their debt incentives increase. Using new
executive compensation disclosures mandated by the SEC, I find a negative association
between CEO SERPs and firm risk but only for unsheltered SERPs. I find that when a
CEO SERP is protected by a lump sum payment or by a trust (i.e. sheltered), the negative
association between SERPs and firm risk is greatly diminished and even eliminated in
some models. Furthermore, I show that having a greater proportion of outside CEOs on a
compensation committee when a new CEO is hired is associated with a higher likelihood
of the new CEO having a SERP. These findings have implications for the method in
which executives are compensated with retirement pay and address the SEC’s growing
concern about the link between compensation and firm risk management practices.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the media and academics have paid more attention to
compensation received by CEOs after they have exited the firm. This post-employment
pay is often composed of various pay forms including supplemental executive retirement
plans (SERP), severance packages, deferred compensation, and other perquisites.1 Many
“retirement packages” have made headlines both in good economic climates and bad. For
example, the media reported that former Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil Lee
Raymond received a retirement package estimated to be worth close to $400 million
subsequent to his retirement in 2005 (Mouawad 2006). The entire $400 million was not
completely related to his retirement; however, he did receive a $98 million lump sum
payment of his pension when he retired (SEC 2006). More recently, the CEO of Bank of
America Ken Lewis announced his plans to step down at the end of 2009. According to
the Wall Street Journal, his retirement package is currently worth $69.7 million
(Fitzpatrick and Solomon 2009). Public pressure to limit CEO pay has increased,
especially in light of recent bonuses received by executives at failing banks. The US
Treasury ordered Ken Lewis to forego his salary and bonus for 2009 in part due to the
magnitude of his retirement package.2

1

Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs) are defined benefit pension plans granted to
executives. They are termed “supplemental” because they exceed the amounts covered by ERISA
regulations. See section (2) for further explanation.
2
Although Bank of America received TARP funds, the Treasury cannot access retirement packages
negotiated prior to receipt of the funds.
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The SEC has continued to increase disclosures surrounding executive
compensation. The SEC’s objective is not only to increase the disclosure of monetary
amounts but require qualitative disclosures addressing compensation strategies and goals.
These disclosures most often made in annual proxy filings provide a link between firm
benchmarks or objectives and executive compensation methods. In December 2009 the
SEC issued a release discussing enhanced disclosures concerning risk, compensation, and
corporate governance (SEC 2009). The intent of the new disclosures is to provide users
of this information not only with the context of compensation as it relates to company
financial performance but also compensation and its affect on firm risk. The SEC outlines
several specific objectives in the release including disclosures about “The relationship of
a company’s compensation policies and practices to risk management” as well as “Board
leadership structure and the board’s role in risk oversight.”
The disclosures reflect growing concern about excessive risk-taking by executives
and its impact on the various stakeholders of the firm. If compensation structures affect
management choices and these choices affect firm characteristics, then firms and
stakeholders must have an understanding of how CEO compensation structures impact
firm risk. In particular, what affect do CEO SERPs have on firm risk? My study
addresses this question.
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) provide one of the first empirical studies
examining compensation owed to the CEO subsequent to service. They refer to these
payments using Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) term “inside debt”. In effect, when a CEO
has a defined benefit pension the executive is like a debt holder against the firm. Jensen
and Meckling (1976) suggest that a firm can eliminate most of the agency costs of debt
2

by having the manager hold an equal portion of debt and equity. This would eliminate
incentive to shift wealth from debt holders to stock holders. My paper extends this
research by considering the probability that the debt holders (CEOs) will actually receive
the full payment. Not all categories of debt are granted with the same rights. I investigate
the differences in the debt (SERPs) granted to CEOs. Based on evidence presented in my
paper, CEO SERPs have varying characteristics beyond size. These varying
characteristics elicit different CEO choices that affect firm risk. Specifically, I find that in
general SERPs are negatively associated with measures of firm risk. However, I also find
that when the SERP payments are sheltered through an alternative payment form or trust,
the negative association between SERPs and risk is attenuated. These findings indicate
that not all inside debt has the same incentive effect. These findings also suggest that
SERPs or other forms of inside debt only serve to reduce agency costs when they share
structures similar to debt instruments (i.e. long term payments as opposed to lump sum or
sheltered payments).
Because many of the SERPs are paid after retirement as life annuities, it is in the
CEO’s best interest to conservatively manage the firm so that the firm is healthy and the
necessary cash exists to pay the SERP. While some argue that this form of payment is
excessive and unrelated to performance, it does seem to encourage the CEO to consider
the long term performance of the firm and operate with the interest of debt holders in
mind. On the other hand, CEOs without SERPs may aggressively attempt to maximize
the equity values of the firm to maximize their personal wealth. Traditionally, this
aggressive behavior has been viewed as a benefit to shareholders. It seems that it is more
common now for shareholders and regulators to question this aggressive behavior and
3

place more concern on the health of the firm in the long run. New SEC regulations
require firms to explain the link between compensation and firm risk (SEC 2009). It is
critical for companies, regulators, and investors to understand not only the impact of
SERPs on firm risk but the impact of specific SERP characteristics.
Executive compensation has been a topic of study for corporate governance
researchers in many different academic areas. The relation between pay and performance
has attracted many researchers since Jensen and Meckling (1976) wrote about the
implications and Jensen (1993) expressed his concerns about the shortcomings of CEO
compensation. The research is only beginning to investigate the implications of postemployment pay. While this is not the first paper to investigate post-employment pay for
CEOs, it is one of the first to investigate specific characteristics of SERPs using the
newly mandated disclosures.
My study contributes to the literature by examining SERP magnitudes and
characteristics and assessing their impact on firm risk. By identifying specific
characteristics of SERPs and testing their associations with risk, I am able to evaluate the
effectiveness of using this form of pay to reduce agency costs. The decisions and
structures that led to the recent recession have caused regulators and investors to not only
consider firm profitability but risk as well. If investors and regulators better understand
the sources and incentives of firm risk, they can properly evaluate compensation
packages.
In the second set of hypotheses outlined in this paper I make predictions
concerning the likelihood of a CEO receiving a SERP based on corporate governance
characteristics of the firm. It is also critical for stakeholders in the firm to not only
4

understand the association between SERPs and firm risk but the determinants of SERPs. I
investigate compensation committee characteristics as well as other internal corporate
governance characteristics and find evidence that having a higher percentage of CEOs
serving on a firm’s compensation committee increases the likelihood that the firm’s CEO
will have a SERP. This has implications for investors who wish to have a say on pay
within the firm. Investors do not directly set CEO pay policies, but they can play an
active role in determining the board structure of a firm. Understanding the influence that
outside CEOs who sit on the board have on the compensation of a firm’s CEO is
important.
The next section contains a discussion of Agency Theory and its relation to
SERPs as well as a brief background on the structure of SERPs. The following two
sections develop the hypotheses concerning SERPs and firm risk followed by the
hypotheses concerning the determinants of a SERP. The fifth section of paper contains
the analysis. The paper concludes with a discussion of the results and implication of the
findings.

5

CHAPTER II
AGENCY THEORY
In Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) discussion of agency costs they address the costs
that arise from a CEO only holding equity in the firm. This scenario aligns CEO interests
with the interests of the shareholders by incentivizing the CEO to manage the firm with
the stockholders in mind. By aligning the investment policy of the firm with the interest
of the stockholders, this may redistribute wealth between debt holders and stockholders.
Jensen and Meckling suggest that if the CEO were bound to hold a fraction of total debt
that equaled the fraction of equity that he or she held then there would no longer be any
incentive to redistribute wealth from debt holders to stockholders.
Corporations have not required CEOs to invest in debt instruments used by the
firm; however, firms may use certain forms of compensation (referred to as inside debt)
such as SERPs as a “debt-like” instrument to align CEO incentives with those of debt
holders. If SERPs are structured as long term agreements for the CEO to receive an
annuity stream in the future, then these plans are very similar to debt (i.e. the company
owes the CEO payments in the future just as the firm owes bondholders payments in the
future). If the SERP annuity is subject to forfeiture in the event of bankruptcy then the
CEO will revise investment policy to ensure the stability of the firm. Jensen and
Meckling would argue that these future payments would align CEO incentives with debt
holders and reduce agency costs because there would be no threat of a redistribution of
wealth between debt holders and stockholders. This appears to be an important
mechanism for reducing agency costs and incentivizing a long-term focus as opposed to a
quarter to quarter focus.
6

Sundram and Yermack (2007) provide evidence that inside debt does change
CEO incentives and reduce agency costs. They argue that when a CEO holds only equity,
he or she has incentive to tolerate excessive risk. The authors analyze firms from the S&P
500 from 1996-2002 and find that when a CEO’s personal debt to equity ratio exceeds
that of the firm’s, then he or she manages more conservatively. Granting large SERPs
encourages executives to manage conservatively in order to protect the future payments.
The authors also find that CEOs are much more likely to retire once their pensions
become fully payable. This paper is one of the first empirical papers to provide evidence
of post-employment pay altering CEO behavior.
Kalyta (2009) measures the relation between retiring CEO pensions and abnormal
accruals. Using a sample of 388 Fortune 1000 CEOs, he finds that retiring CEOs are
more likely to manage earnings upward in the years immediately preceding retirement
when the value of the SERP is impacted by performance. He does not find this result for
SERPs that do not have a performance component. This is a unique finding that suggests
not all SERPs are identical and that unique characteristics can change behavior. While the
inside debt theory presented by Jensen and Meckling is supported empirically, what
qualifies as inside debt may depend on the structure of the compensation. The structure of
the SERP may have implications for the effectiveness of this form of compensation
serving its purpose to reduce agency costs.

SERP Structure
My paper investigates differing characteristics of SERPs. First, I provide a
background on the basic structure of SERPs. Companies may offer two primary types of
7

retirement plans to their executives – qualified and/or non-qualified plans.3 Qualified
plans are regulated by ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code. These plans are offered to
most employees within a company and offer certain tax advantages. These plans are
regulated by ERISA to provide protection of deferred compensation and fringe benefits
for common employees (Kennedy 2002). Although not intended to safeguard the interests
of executives, CEOs can participate in the programs as long as they follow the
regulations. In order for CEOs to participate, the total level of retirement funds
contributed to the plan cannot exceed regulated amounts. Because these amounts are
somewhat limited in terms of CEO compensation, many companies have structured
nonqualified executive compensation plans also known as supplemental executive
retirement plans (SERPs).
A SERP does not receive the preferential tax treatment enjoyed by the qualified
plans. However, there is no limit as to the amount that may be accumulated within the
SERP. Under a qualified plan, an employee does not incur any tax liability for “receiving
a vested and funded right to receive deferred compensation”, and the employer gets a tax
deduction for making a contribution to the trust (Kennedy 2002). Furthermore, these
amounts are generally protected in the event of bankruptcy. Under a nonqualified plan or
SERP, the employee does not incur a tax liability for the amounts contributed to the
SERP, but the employer does not receive a tax deduction until distribution. Once the cash
is distributed, the employee is taxed on the distributed amount. However, all deferred
amounts must be unavailable to the employee or subject to “substantial risk of loss or

3

See Gerakos (2007) for a thorough explanation of the “Institutional Background” of executive retirement
plans.
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forfeiture”, otherwise the amounts become immediately taxable (Kennedy 2002). This is
important for one primary reason as it relates to my study; SERPs must remain unfunded
if the CEO wishes to avoid an immediate tax liability for the SERP. If amounts are set
aside for payment to the CEO and not available to general creditors, then the SERP
amounts may become taxable (Kennedy 2002; Clark and Forman 2004).
Prior literature in this area has been based on estimated SERP values due to
limited disclosures. The SEC crafted new executive compensation disclosure regulations
that became effective in 2007. The new regulations have significantly increased the
nature and amount of data available to the public concerning executive compensation.
Among many changes, the SEC now requires specific disclosures concerning executive
retirement/pension agreements and severance agreements. These disclosures not only
include negotiated amounts but the events that would trigger payment by the company.
The current body of research concerning retirement packages in the law, finance,
management, and accounting literatures finds that SERPs are common although not
universal for all firms. Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) find that 68% of the CEOs in their
sample participated in a company sponsored pension plan. These plans had an estimated
median actuarial net present value of $15 million ranging from a minimum of $3.3
million to a maximum of $73.3 million. Their research also indicates that the average
CEO retirement package represents a very significant amount of an executive’s lifetime
pay – 35% (median) in their sample. Some research attempts to provide evidence in
support of various compensation theories that provide determinants for the agreements.
Very little research investigates the impact of these agreements on firm outcomes such as
performance or risk.
9

Currently, the few papers in this area have only estimated SERP magnitudes.
Furthermore, samples have been formed by searching for CEOs who have already exited
the firm. Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) study a sample of CEOs who departed office
during 2003 and 2004. They gathered information on total compensation and retirement
pay from SEC filings and calculated estimated pension values. The authors conclude that
SERPs have very little impact on performance during the tenure of the CEO. They argue
that retirement pay does not affect performance because most of the retirement packages
analyzed are a function of salary, not performance. Because pensions serve as a “salarylike” payment, the authors conclude that these pay packages have no impact on
performance. The paper provides an excellent descriptive background of SERPs;
however, the conclusions were reached based on compensation theory, not empirical
testing.
One of the first empirical papers to investigate SERPs is Gerakos (2007). He
investigates pensions to determine whether they are a function of managerial rent
extraction or optimal contracting between boards of directors and CEOs and to determine
the effectiveness of the 2007 SEC disclosures. He has a unique proprietary data set of 172
publicly traded firms as well as a data set consisting of S&P 500 firms. The proprietary
data set was generated by a compensation consultant who surveyed companies and the
retirement packages provided to executives. Gerakos finds the strongest evidence that
optimal contracting determines the pension practices of large corporations, but he does
find some support for the managerial power hypothesis. If the CEO is exercising undue
influence over the firm then this suggests the need for an understanding of the
governance structure surrounding these practices. He also predicts that the changes to the
10

disclosures regarding pensions in 2007 will have little impact on investors, because most
of the needed information can be surmised from present disclosures. Wei and Yermack
(2009) test stockholder and bondholder reactions subsequent to the disclosures in 2007
and find that markets did react significantly to the disclosures, counter to Gerakos (2007)
expectations.
It is important to understand the structure of the SERP including the various tax
regulations applicable to this form of compensation. Based on the brief description of the
tax laws and some of the prior research, it is evident that SERPs can be arranged in
various forms. Not only can the funding status vary from CEO to CEO but the payment
options vary. Some SERPs are paid out over the course of retirement as an annuity and
some are paid in a lump sum. These varying characteristics have not thoroughly been
investigated in the literature in part due to the limited disclosures prior to 2007. Most of
the models in prior research focuses on the amount of the SERP alone (Bebchuk and
Jackson 2005; Sundaram and Yermack 2007). Accounting for the nuances of each SERP
agreement will improve and clarify the extant research.

11

CHAPTER III
FIRM RISK HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Prospect Theory
Prospect theory offers an alternative explanation to expected utility theory for
individual decision making. Consider an individual’s choice given alternative options
varying in risk. Often this is expressed as a lottery supplying different payouts based on a
risky choice verses a safe choice. The choice could also consist of multiple alternatives
with varying degrees of probabilities. In a risk neutral setting an individual will choose
the option with the highest expected value. The choice will differ once risk aversion is
introduced into the setting (Ross 2004; Carlson and Lazrak 2009). A risk averse
individual seeks to maximize personal utility as opposed to choosing the option that
results in the highest expected value (Davis and Holt 1993). However, Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) find that “individuals tend to underweight outcomes that are merely
probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty” – the certainty
effect of prospect theory.
CEO Decision Making
CEOs with SERPs have wealth that is promised to them with certainty as long as
the firm does not enter bankruptcy. These CEOs still have equity in the firm, but the
value of this equity largely depends on the performance of the firm as a result of
investment choices by the CEO. Prospect theory predicts that these CEOs will
underweight the outcomes associated with the equity and overweight the certainty of the
SERP. That is to say that CEOs will act to manage the firm conservatively for the
certainty of a large SERP even if that results in not maximizing the value of their own

12

equity holdings. For example, a CEO may have the opportunity to invest in two different
projects that are mutually exclusive. If one is a risky project with a range of payoffs and
the other a safe project with a range of payoffs, the incentive compensation is designed to
incentivize the CEO to make the most profitable decision for shareholders. While the
majority of executive compensation literature has examined CEO behavior related to pay
received during his or her tenure, more recent research indicates that retirement pay may
impact decision making as well (Bebchuk and Jackson 2005, Inderst and Mueller 2006,
Sundaram and Yermack 2007, and Gerakos 2007). These papers have provided evidence
that compensation contracted to be received subsequent to service could affect behavior
during service. The decision concerning two mutually exclusive projects with varying
payoff probabilities is now being made by an executive who not only has current cash
and incentive pay but perhaps a large retirement package.
In general, a SERP is an unfunded, unguaranteed annuity to be paid throughout
retirement. Because the amount is unfunded and unguaranteed, the SERP payments are
subject to the performance of the firm at the time of the CEOs retirement as well as future
performance under a new CEO. One obvious detriment to payment would be the firm
entering bankruptcy. If this occurred, the CEO would lose all right to the SERP. For this
reason, it is in the best interest of the CEO to conserve cash and work to leave the
company in the safest financial condition possible. This maximizes the probability of full
payment of the SERP amount.

13

As previously mentioned, prior research finds a positive association between CEO
personal debt-to-equity ratios and distance from default.4 Sundaram and Yermack (2007)
measure firm distance from bankruptcy as a proxy for firm risk. Their results indicate that
CEOs manage conservatively when their personal debt to equity ratios exceed their firm’s
debt to equity ratio. I employ standard measures of risk (beta and standard deviation of
returns) and test the direct impact of SERPs on risk regardless of the CEO’s personal debt
to equity ratio. The relation between standard firm risk measures and SERPs has not been
investigated. Because CEOs will want to ensure payment of their SERP, they will choose
to manage the firm conservatively. This effect should increase as the size of the SERP
increases. As such, I would expect that there exist a negative relation between the size of
the CEO’s SERP and firm risk.
H1: CEO SERP values are negatively associated with firm risk.
Research has been mixed concerning the proper balance of performance sensitive
pay and cash. While some studies find evidence in favor of the incentive effect of
performance-based pay, other studies have found evidence supporting a risk aversion
effect. Mehran (1995) and Mishra et al. (2000) both find a positive correlation between
performance sensitive pay and firm value. Brick et al. (2008) and Carlson and Lazrak
(2009) both show in their settings that increasing performance pay decreases future
volatility. Risk-averse managers decrease overall firm risk in order to safeguard their pay.
The authors conclude that the risk-aversion effect dominates the incentive effect because
the manager’s compensation is exposed to more risk. Although intuitively it seems that

4

Sundaram and Yermack (2007) define the CEO personal debt to equity ratio as compensation owed to the
CEO by the firm subsequent to service (debt) divided by equity compensation (stock and options).
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larger SERPs are associated with less risk, large SERPs that are relatively sheltered (i.e.
protected by a trust or lump-sum payment) may encourage different risk taking behavior
than less secure SERPs5.
Given the updated SEC disclosures beginning in 2007, researchers are now able
to gather more informative data concerning the structure of the CEO compensation
agreements and retirement packages in particular. One unique characteristic of the SERP
that varies among firms is the payment option. Some firms require that the CEO receive
the value of their pension in the form of an annuity throughout retirement. Other firms
require the CEO to receive the value of the pension in a lump sum. And alternatively
some CEOs are given the option of a lump sum or installments. There is also evidence
that some CEOs have “SERP Swaps” or “Secular Trusts” that guarantee payment of the
obligation (Bebchuk and Jackson 2005, Sundaram and Yermack 2007). The differing
characteristics of retirement packages vary not only in form but also in probability of
payment. A CEO who has the option to take a lump sum at retirement has a higher
probability that he or she will actually receive the funds as opposed to the CEO who
receives his or her payments over the remainder of their life. Not only are the funds
immediately available for personal use with a lump sum payment, they are not subject to
future firm performance primarily controlled by a new CEO. If the majority of CEO
SERPs are subject to creditors in the event of bankruptcy, then it behooves CEOs to
conservatively manage the firm to protect their retirement, even at the cost of sacrificing
wealth that might have been accumulated on stock and option values. On the other hand,
the CEO with the lump sum option receives his or her payment quickly upon retirement
5

See Appendix A for a discussion of ways that a SERP may be “sheltered” through the formation of a trust.
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and may be less concerned about conservatively managing the firm to avoid bankruptcy
or loss. He or she does not have to worry about future firm performance, has much
greater control over the profitability and liquidity of the firm at the time that the benefit is
paid; therefore, he or she is able to take risks to maximize personal stock and option
values knowing that the SERP is relatively safe.6 This is expressed in the second
hypothesis.
H2: The negative association between CEO SERP values and firm risk is
attenuated when the SERP is sheltered.7
The 2007 disclosures also provide greater insight into negotiated severance
agreements for executives. Severance agreements also have a potential impact on the
decision making of CEOs, especially when combined with a large SERP agreement.
Yermack (2006) investigates these agreements and finds evidence that 50% of his sample
receive a severance payout upon voluntary or involuntary termination. He finds that most
of the involuntary packages are larger than the voluntary and concludes that these
packages serve as an ex post settling up mechanism. Rau and Xu (2008) perform a
similar study with a larger sample and apply various executive compensation theories –
risk compensation, incentive tradeoff, rent extraction, and boilerplate. Most of their
findings are consistent with the risk compensation theory. CEOs incur professional
6

In theory it could be possible for CEOs to sell their rights to future pension payments in return for a lump
sum distribution through a guaranteed insurance contract (GIC). However, the discount rate that would be
applied to this transaction would likely be very large given the risk that the insurer now faces and the
increased information asymmetry between the insurer and company as compared to the CEO and company.
Furthermore, I have had a discussion with an executive at a Fortune 500 firm who was part of the
company’s SERP, and he indicated that on only one occasion had he heard of a fellow executive try to
exchange future payments for a lump sum payment. He said that the negotiated discount rate that was to be
applied was so large that the executive chose not to enter the transaction.
7
SERP payments are defined as sheltered if the payment method is a lump sum or the CEO has a lump sum
option. The payments are also sheltered if they are protected by a trust or “SERP swap”.
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reputation risk when joining a firm. The magnitude of this risk may depend on the risk of
the firm. Rau and Xu’s findings indicate that the size of the severance package is
correlated with firm risk. They also find that firms with strong corporate governance have
change in control clauses as part of the severance agreements that encourage CEOs to
seek out positive merger opportunities. Inderst and Mueller (2005) draw similar
conclusions in their theoretical investigation of severance agreements. Their study shows
that these agreements can be used to incentivize the CEO to share (rather than hide) bad
news and even exit the firm if it is in the best interest of shareholders. Severance
agreements may provide differing incentives based on their structure but nonetheless
affect CEO risk tolerance and should not be ignored in an analysis of decision making.
Hypothesis two predicts that the additional security of a formal severance agreement
combined with a SERP will encourage greater risk taking by the CEO. SERP agreements
generally define a “normal retirement age” or length of service required in order to
receive the full estimated benefit. In the event that a CEO chooses to retire, leave the firm
early, or is dismissed, the estimated SERP benefit is adjusted down to reflect fewer years
of service. (The SERP may also be adjusted up in the event that the CEO chooses to
remain in his or her position beyond the “normal retirement age”.) While having a
severance agreement will not generally affect the calculation of the SERP or any
adjustments due to length of service, a severance agreement may provide additional
security in the event that the CEO departs early and the SERP benefit is adjusted down.
The overall wealth for a CEO who departs early will be higher if a negotiated severance
agreement exists. This difference in overall wealth may have an impact on decisions
made during the CEO’s tenure. The severance agreement may provide the CEO
17

opportunity to increase risk in an attempt to maximize stock and option values. If the
company does not prosper and chooses to remove the CEO, then a CEO with a severance
agreement and SERP will be in a much better financial position than one who does not
receive severance and has his or her SERP adjusted down.
H3: The negative association between CEO SERP values and firm risk is
attenuated due to the interaction effect of a SERP and negotiated severance
agreement.
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CHAPTER IV
DETERMINANTS OF SERPS HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
In another stream of research there are a growing number of papers seeking to
evaluate compensation committee quality or effectiveness. Compensation committee
quality has been a challenging variable to measure primarily because research has not
clearly defined a set of effective characteristics. The next section of this study measures
those characteristics that are correlated with CEOs receiving SERPs. Combined with
what is learned from the previous hypotheses of the paper, this section may provide
evidence of associations between compensation committee structure and firm risk.
Researchers that have studied compensation committees have at times failed to
find an association between standard corporate governance measures and CEO
compensation. Independence of committee members and CEO involvement are two
examples of variables that have had a significant impact on board and committee
effectiveness in other literatures, but the association is not as strong for compensation
committee studies. Tests for association between CEO pay and various governance
measures may fail to find results when the incorrect attribute of CEO compensation is
analyzed. Although some association has been found between governance measures and
salary and/or options, these studies were not able to look for an association between
governance measures and other forms of CEO compensation such as SERPs. This study
will extend this research by testing the association between previously examined
governance variables and CEO SERPs.
Brick et al. (2006) find evidence that excess director compensation leads to excess
CEO compensation. There is also growing evidence in the audit committee literature that
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audit committee member incentives affect decision making. Archambeault et al. (2008)
find a significant positive relation between accounting restatements and audit committee
members receiving short-term stock option grants. The result does not hold for audit
committee members receiving long-term stock option grants. Bierstaker et al. (2009) find
similar benefits to compensating audit committee members with long-term incentives.
Specifically, audit committee members compensated with long-term incentives are more
likely to support the auditor in a dispute with management. These papers provide
evidence that directors may act differently based on their own compensation. As research
continues to grow in the area of CEO retirement packages and the effect on firm
performance, it will be important to understand the types of compensation committees
that are associated with these packages. Because the prior literature suggests that CEO
SERPs are large cash sums that are generally not very sensitive to performance, I expect
directors with large annual retainers, not sensitive to performance, to be more likely to
grant large SERPs.
H4: The size of the compensation committees’ annual retainers will have a
positive impact on the likelihood of the CEO having a SERP.
Other studies have investigated the impact that director stock ownership has on
CEO pay (Conyon and He 2004, Sun et al. 2009). Director ownership of the firm could
have two potential effects. With directors interests more closely aligned with shareholder
interests, directors may increase monitoring efforts. Conyon and He (2004) find that the
level of director ownership and the level CEO compensation are inversely related. This
finding suggests that directors who are also owners of the firm may choose to lower the
overall level of CEO compensation. Directors may also choose to structure CEO
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compensation in a way that increases pay-performance sensitivity. Sun et al. (2009) show
that increased compensation committee quality is associated with a more sensitive payperformance link. Based on compensation committee members beliefs concerning the
incentive effect of SERPs, members with stock ownership may be less likely to grant
SERPs if they believe this will weaken the pay-performance link. Alternatively, if
directors believe that providing a SERP for the CEO will reduce overall firm risk then
they may grant SERPs in order to protect their equity ownership from short-term
volatility. The previous research in this area shows that directors with equity ownership
behave differently than those without. However, it is unclear if directors will be more
likely or less likely to grant a SERP if they have equity ownership. The following nondirectional hypothesis will be tested.
H5: The equity ownership of the compensation committee members will have an
impact on the likelihood of the CEO having a SERP.
The presence of CEOs on compensation committees is another characteristic that
has received attention in the literature. Conyon and He (2004), Anderson and Bizjak
(2003), Daily et al. (1998), and Sun et al. (2009) have all investigated the impact that
having a CEO on the compensation committee has on CEO pay. Most researchers’
intuition suggests that having a CEO on the compensation committee will lead to higher
pay for that firm’s CEO. After all, this is a relatively small network of individuals that is
often thought of as having a sort of fraternal relationship. However, there is very little
evidence supporting this intuition. The majority of evidence indicates that having a CEO
on the compensation committee has no real effect on the level of compensation. While
salaries, bonuses, and options may not reflect the influence of CEOs on compensation
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committees, retirement plans may. SERP arrangements have historically been subject to
less disclosure than other forms of CEO compensation. For this reason, CEOs may know
that post-employment pay will be less scrutinized than other forms. Prior research
indicates that a slight majority of CEOs have SERP arrangements (Bebchuk and Jackson
2005, Sundaram and Yermack 2007). Perhaps based on the common occurrence of these
packages within the CEO network, CEO compensation committee members will be more
likely to grant them for other CEOs.
H6: The presence of outside CEOs on the compensation committee will have a
positive impact on the likelihood of a CEO having a SERP.
Lastly, most research in the area of board and committee effectiveness supports
the notion that committees are a subset of the board and characteristics of the board
impact committee effectiveness. One board element that seems to be of particular
importance to CEO pay is the presence of outside blockholders (Core et al. 1999,
Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2009). Blockholders serve as diligent external monitors of
CEO activity and pay. These studies as well as others show that the presence of outside
blockholders can serve to limit CEO pay. Executive compensation consistently garners
much attention from the media and investor groups, and because there has not been a
plethora of research done in the area of CEO SERPs, most media and investor groups
seem to view these packages as another form of corporate excess. Alternatively, it is
possible the blockholders who are not transitory investors may recognize the benefit of
the CEO having a SERP and acting in the long-term interest of the firm. These investors
may understand the reduction in agency costs and the related benefits. I do not make a
directional prediction with this hypothesis due to the competing explanations.
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H7: The presence of outside blockholders will have an impact on the likelihood of
a CEO having a SERP.
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CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS
Sample
The hypotheses are tested using a sample of S&P 500 firms as of 2006. The
earliest SERP data made available by the new disclosures reports SERP values at the end
of fiscal year 2006. The sample includes companies in financial industries. The recent
events surrounding the banking crisis and regulation reform make this industry
particularly interesting with respect to my study.8 The final sample is constrained by data
available in Compustat, CRSP, and Execucomp. SERP and severance agreement data is
hand collected from 2007 company proxy statements that report 2006 values. Table 1
details lost observations and reports a sample size of 410. Any firms that went through a
merger or experienced a CEO turnover during 2006 were eliminated from the sample.
Thirty-seven firms were eliminated because of this constraint. An additional 43 firms
were dropped from the sample because of missing data from at least one of the primary
data sources – CRSP, Compustat, and Execucomp. Finally, 10 observations are lost due
to a lack of information related to the proxy filing.
The dependent variables used to measure firm risk are two measures of equity risk
– the standard deviation of daily stock returns and beta. There are other measures of firm
risk; however, equity risk is the risk that is most directly linked to shareholders. In the
crafting of executive compensation disclosures by the SEC and executive compensation

8

In an unreported additional sensitivity analysis the financial firms have been dropped. The results remain
unchanged but are not disclosed.
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Table 1
Analysis of Sample
S&P 500

500

Firms dropped due to merger, CEO turnover, or other
events during 2006.
Missing returns data from CRSP, Compustat, and/or Execucomp
Incomplete or missing data from proxy filings

(37)
(43)
(10)

Total Sample

410

CEOs with SERPs
CEOs without SERPs

253
157

regulations by law makers, it is most often the stockholders with whom they are most
concerned.9
Following the approach by Low (2009), the main dependent variable of interest is
the standard deviation of returns. This is a measure of total firm risk. I measure daily
returns for a year, calculate the standard deviation, and impose a natural log
transformation (Low 2009 and Kothari et al. 2009). However, to add rigor to the analysis
I also calculate Beta using one year of returns and take the natural log.
Control variables common to both of the dependent variables are used in the
analysis and are based on prior literature (Botosan and Plumlee 2005, Ryan 1997, and
Fama and French 1993). The natural log of total assets (LNASSETS) at the end of the
year controls for size. I measure a one year lag of the market-to-book (MB) ratio to
control for growth opportunities, while a lag of return-on-assets (ROA) controls for
9

There is debate in the finance and accounting literature as to what type of risk these measures actually
capture. My paper does not attempt to further parse the differences in these measures. Rather, I employ
both measures in an attempt to provide rigor to the study.
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profitability. Leverage (LEV) is total short and long term debt divided by total long and
short term debt plus total stockholders’ equity following Sundaram and Yermack (2007).
Following other research assessing investment policy (Low 2009, Coles et al. 2006, and
Bargeron et al. 2010), my paper measures research and development expenditures and
capital expenditures to control for firm risk that may be changing due to investment
policy. Not all risk is directly related to these accounting measures, but these measures
help provide evidence of CEOs either accepting or rejecting positive net present value
projects. Both variables are a three year average of the expenditures. Lastly, to control for
other elements of compensation that impact CEO decision making, I sum salary and
bonus over three years and take the average to control for cash compensation
(CASHCOMP). I use delta to control for CEO pay-performance sensitivity described by
Core and Guay (2002). I also control for a CEO’s portfolio value sensitivity to stock
return volatility by measuring VEGA (Core and Guay 2002). I use the variable
LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES to measure delta for the combined stock and option
portfolio. This approach to measuring CEO incentives is quite common in the literature
(Core and Guay 2002, Coles et al. 2006, and Low 2009).
The SERP variable is the value of the SERP as of the company’s fiscal year end
in 2006. The SHELTER variable is a binary variable equal to one if the SERP payment is
in a lump-sum form upon retirement or the funds used to pay the SERP are set aside in a
trust. The severance variable is a binary variable equal to one if the CEO has a negotiated
severance agreement. The conditions, forms, and triggers of severance agreements are
complex. My paper only begins to investigate the impact of severance agreements on
risk. Severance agreements generally define different amounts of compensation for
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differing triggering events: voluntary verses involuntary dismissal, involuntary dismissal
for cause verses not for cause, etc. For this reason, only one distinction is made as it
pertains to severance arrangements. The CEO must have a severance agreement beyond
the scope of a change in control agreement. Change in control agreements are put in place
to compensate management in the event that the company experiences a merger,
acquisition, or some other form of combination and the executives are dismissed. Based
on evidence gathered in proxies, these agreements seem to be fairly universal. The
severance variable (SEV) in my paper only measures severance agreements above and
beyond a change-in-control agreement.

Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the SERP variable and a listing of the
ten largest SERPs by company and CEO for the sample. Out of 410 sample observations,
253 CEOs have SERPs. The mean value is $10.5 million with a standard deviation of
$12.1 million. The largest SERP in the sample is held by Ed Whitacre with AT&T. As of
the end of 2006 it was worth $84.667 million. While none of the SERPs in my sample are
as large as Lee Raymond’s SERP from ExxonMobil, it is clear that there are other SERP
values approaching the $100M threshold.10
Descriptive statistics for the remaining variables are provided in Table 3. The
firms are grouped into two groups - CEOs without a SERP and CEOs with a SERP.
Significant differences in variable means are noted in Panel B of Table 3. Firms with

10

Ed Whitacre does not actually have the largest SERP in the S&P500. William McGuire, United Health
Group, has a SERP worth $91.3M. However, missing data for other variables forced this observation from
the sample.
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Table 2
SERP Statistics
Descriptive statistics of the SERPs in the sample. All dollar values are in thousands (000). All firms are
included in the S&P 500. Data comes from 2007 company proxy statements reflecting values as of fiscal
year end 2006.

SERP Summary Statistics
253
N
Mean

10,500

Med

6,675

Std. Dev.

12,100

Min

67

Max

84,700

Rank

Company

CEO

SERP Value

1

AT&T

Edward E. Whitacre, Jr.

84,667

2

Pfizer

Henry McKinnel

82,306

3

ConocoPhillips

J.J. Mulva

58,582

4

News Corp

K. Rupert Murdoch

58,369

5

AFLAC Inc

Daniel P. Amos

49,359

6

Bank of America

Kenneth D. Lewis

49,154

7

Colgate-Palmolive

Reuben Mark

42,858

8

Textron Inc

Lewis B. Campbell

40,084

9

Prudential Financial

Arthur Ryan

36,805

10

McKesson Corp

John H. Hammergren

34,658
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics by SERP Status
Descriptive statistics by SERP status are presented below for the current sample gathered. The characteristics of firms
managed by CEOs without SERPs are presented in Panel A. The characteristics of firms managed by CEOs with SERP
are presented in Panel B. Tests of differences in means between firms with and firms without SERPs are provided in
Panel B. ***, **, * next to the mean indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. BETA is
calculated using one year of returns. The standard deviation of returns is measured by calculating the standard deviation
of daily returns for a year. Leverage (LEV) is measured as total short and long term debt divided by total long and short
term debt plus total stockholders’ equity following Sundaram and Yermack (2007). MB is a one year lag ratio of
market value to book value. ROA is a one year lag of net income divided by total assets. R&D and CAPEX represent a
three year average of research and development and capital expenditures. CASHCOMP is a three year average of cash
plus bonus compensation. PORTFOLIOINCENTIVES measures CEO pay-performance sensitivity and VEGA
measures CEO pay sensitivity to stock return volatility. SEV is a binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a severance
package.

Variable

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Firms whose CEOs do not have a
SERP.
Beta
Std. Dev. Of Ret.
Total Assets (in millions)
Leverage
Market to Book
ROA
R&D (in millions)
CAPEX (in millions)
CashComp (in thousands)
Portfolio Incentives (in thousands)
Vega
Severance

1.15
0.02
25,910.81
0.28
4.24
0.08
18.86
675.03
1,776.22
5,508.07
328.13
0.55

1.04
0.02
8,544.00
0.24
3.28
0.08
0.00
159.39
1,000.00
955.12
157.69
1.00

0.54
0.01
82,541.48
0.24
6.60
0.07
85.03
1,858.35
3,381.13
22,917.39
489.61
0.50

0.35
0.01
810.29
0.00
0.76
-0.26
0.00
0.00
0.00
18.10
0.00
0.00

2.84
0.03
707,121.00
0.84
79.73
0.30
798.02
15,228.00
32,208.33
247,606.40
4,116.72
1.00

Firms whose CEOs do have a
SERP.
Beta
Std. Dev. Of Ret.
Total Assets (in millions)
Leverage
Market to Book
ROA
R&D (in millions)
CAPEX (in millions)
CashComp (in thousands)
Portfolio Incentives (in thousands)
Vega
Severance

0.91 ***
0.01 ***
66,579.95 **
0.42 ***
2.93 *
0.06 ***
18.29
925.04
1,937.51
1,795.37 **
273.66
0.64 *

0.80
0.50
0.01
0.00
17,067.00 203,511.70
0.37
0.23
2.57
6.76
0.05
0.06
0.00
131.00
342.67
1,744.36
1,155.99
2,727.31
832.63
5,840.53
202.23
290.75
1.00
0.48
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0.13
3.08
0.01
0.03
1,497.70 1,884,318.00
0.00
1.12
-61.20
57.63
-0.43
0.38
0.00
1,486.67
0.00
14,736.33
637.89
25,683.69
37.90
85,054.37
0.00
2,226.05
0.00
1.00

CEOs that have a SERP are larger and more leveraged than those firms whose CEO does
not have a SERP. Interestingly, market-to-book and ROA are smaller for firms whose
CEO has a SERP than firms without. The mean value of portfolio incentives (delta) is
smaller for CEOs with SERPs indicating that these CEOs receive less performance
sensitive pay. The difference is statistically significant. The descriptive statistics also
indicate that CEOs with SERPs are more likely to have a severance agreement. The
dependent variables also show significant differences between groups. The CEOs with
SERPs group has a lower mean BETA and a lower mean standard deviation of returns.
This provides preliminary evidence for hypothesis 1. While differences appear to exist
between the two groups as it pertains to research and development, capital expenditures,
cash compensation, and vega these differences are not statistically significant at standard
levels.
Pair wise correlations are presented in Table 4. Other than the strong correlation
between the two measures of firm risk, there does not appear to be any strong correlations
in the data. This indicates that multicollinearity should not be an issue in the multivariate
setting. VIF scores were calculated to confirm this assumption following the OLS
regressions.
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Table 4
Correlation Matrix
Correlations are presented below with p-values disclosed below the correlation. Statistically significant correlations are
in bold.

SERP

BETA

Std. Dev.
Of Ret.

Total Assets

Leverage

Market to Book

ROA

SERP

1

BETA

-0.1661
0.0006

1

Std. Dev. Of Ret.

-0.2482
0

0.8178
0

1

Total Assets

0.18
0.0002

-0.1154
0.0179

-0.218
0

1

Leverage

0.101
0.0386

-0.2476
0

-0.279
0

0.2741
0

1

Market to Book

-0.0194
0.6899

0.0454
0.3537

0.0657
0.1792

-0.0502
0.3054

-0.0687
0.1612

1

ROA

-0.0664
0.1707

0.1118
0.022

0.0793
0.105

-0.1616
0.0009

-0.4487
0

0.5175
0

1

R&D

0.139
0.0043

-0.0639
0.1905

0.016
0.7437

-0.0124
0.8002

-0.0569
0.2445

0.0267
0.5864

0.0893
0.0678

CAPEX

0.2534
0

-0.0819
0.0933

-0.1229
0.0116

0.2587
0

0.0445
0.363

-0.0391
0.4243

0.033
0.5006

CASHCOMP

0.1222
0.0113

-0.0048
0.921

-0.0551
0.2597

0.2622
0

0.0397
0.4174

-0.0344
0.479

-0.0606
0.2113

PortfolioIncentives

-0.0333
0.4968

-0.015
0.7614

0.0058
0.9071

-0.0023
0.9621

-0.0571
0.2476

0.1017
0.0378

0.0796
0.1045

TotalVega

0.163

-0.0749

-0.0174

0.0938

-0.083

0.0114

0.1198

0.0007

0.1226

0.7196

0.053

0.0873

0.8135

0.0128

0.0329
0.5016

-0.064
0.195

-0.006
0.9037

-0.0865
0.0795

0.0268
0.5877

0.014
0.775

-0.0475
0.3328

R&D

CAPEX

CASHCOMP

EQUITYCOMP VEGA

SEVERANCE

R&D

1

CAPEX

0.0038
0.9383

1

CASHCOMP

-0.0209
0.6686

0.1627
0.0008

1

PortfolioIncentives

0.0147
0.7661

0.01
0.84

0.0056
0.9095

1

TotalVega

0.1047

0.1741

0.1095

0.1127

0.0307

0.0003

0.0226

0.0194

-0.0901
0.0678

-0.0506
0.3057

0.0138
0.778

-0.117
0.0178

SEVERANCE
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SEVERANCE

1

-0.0623
0.2054

1

SERPs and Firm Risk
The focus of the first part of the analysis is the impact of CEO SERP on firm risk
given differing characteristics of CEO SERPs (tests of hypotheses 1-3). The second part
of the analysis will test the hypotheses related to the determinants of a SERP (test of
hypotheses 4-7). Hypothesis 1 is tested to evaluate the overall impact of CEO SERPs on
firm risk. The second hypothesis is tested to show that the impact of CEO SERPs
depends upon SERP payment characteristics. The third hypothesis is tested to evaluate
how a SERP may affect firm risk when the CEO has a severance agreement as well as a
SERP. To test hypothesis 1 in a multivariate setting, the following OLS regression
equation is used.11
RISK = β0 + β1SERP + β2 LNASSETS + β3 LEV + β4MB + β5ROA + β6R&D +
β7CAPEX + β8CASHCOMP + β9LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES + β10VEGA + β11SEV
+ε
(1)
RISK

= Standard Deviation of Returns in one model and BETA
in the other model.

SERP

= A continuous measure of the size of SERP values at the
end of the 2006 fiscal year.

LNASSETS

= Natural log of assets at the end of the 2006 fiscal year.

LEV

= Based on Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and measured
as total debt (short and long term) divided by total debt plus
book value of equity.

MB

= Market value divided by book value lagged by one year.

ROA

= Net income divided by total assets lagged by one year.

R&D

= Three year average of research and development
expenditures for t-2, t-1, and t.

11

All regressions throughout the paper are robust to heteroskedasticity and control for industry using Fama
and French industry groups.
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CAPEX

= Three year average of capital expenditures for t-2, t-1,
and t.

CASHCOMP

= Three year (2004-2006) average of salary plus bonus
compensation.

LNPORTFOLIO
INCENTIVES

= Measure of CEO pay-performance sensitivity. It is
calculated as the dollar change in CEO stock and option
portfolio for a 1% change in stock price.

VEGA

= Measure of CEO pay sensitivity to stock return volatility.
It is calculated as the dollar change in CEO option holdings
for a 1% change in stock return volatility.

SEV

= Binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a negotiated
severance agreement.

The regression results with only the control variables are shown in columns (1)
and (3) of Table 5. Size is negatively associated with both measures of risk. Leverage is
negatively associated with beta. While these findings are expected for size, it is expected
that leverage would be positively associated with risk. It is possible that this finding is
idiosyncratic to my sample that includes only the S&P 500 firms. In general, these firms
are not highly leveraged. It is also possible that stronger and more stable firms have
higher debt capacities. The market to book ratio is positive in both columns as expected.
This ratio may indicate growth opportunities and would be positively associated with
risk. Research and development is positive and significant as expected in the standard
deviation of returns model. VEGA is positive and significant in the standard deviation of
returns model. The SEV variable indicating the existence of a severance agreement is
positive as expected but not significant in either model.
The SERP variable is added to the regression and the results are displayed in
columns (2) and (4). As predicted in hypothesis 1, the SERP variable is negatively
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Table 5
SERP Impact on Firm Risk
This table presents a cross section of OLS regression estimates of the standard deviation of returns and equal weighted
betas by firm. These dependent variables were estimated for the 2006 fiscal year. The dependent variables were
multiplied by 104 to improve the display of the estimates (Sundaram and Yermack 2007). Columns (1) and (3) contain
the regression with only the control variables. The SERP variable is added to the regression in columns (2) and (4).
SERP values were collected from company proxy statements issued at the beginning of the 2007 fiscal year. Industry is
controlled for using Fama and French industry groups. Standard errors are reported in italics. All regressions are robust
to heteroskedasticity. SERP is a continuous variable measuring the magnitude of the SERP. Leverage (LEV) is
measured as total short and long term debt divided by total short and long term debt plus total stockholders’ equity
following Sundaram and Yermack (2007). MB is a one year lag ratio of market value to book value. ROA is a one year
lag of net income divided by total assets. R&D and CAPEX represent a three year average of research and development
and capital expenditures. CASHCOMP is a three year average of cash plus bonus compensation.
LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES measures CEO pay-performance sensitivity and VEGA measures CEO pay sensitivity
to stock return volatility. SEV is a binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a severance package.
Dependent Variables

Standard Deviation of Returns
1

2

SERP
LNASSETS
LEV
MB
ROA
R&D
CAPEX
CASHCOMP
LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES
VEGA
SEVERANCE
Observations
R2

-891.493 ***
160.318
-1021.331
874.481
59.385 ***
16.344
-12154.980 ***
2583.450
2.536 ***
0.921
-0.091
0.060
-0.030
0.031
21.107
104.871
0.911 ***
0.341
312.319
266.627
410
0.594

Beta
3

-0.00004 ***
0.00001
-780.190 ***
154.800
-992.675
855.186
59.939 ***
16.181
-12220.790 ***
2568.091
3.104 ***
0.863
-0.077
0.066
-0.032
0.033
76.176
102.355
0.944 ***
0.322
363.602
264.027
410
0.607

4

-827.864 ***
259.171
-2781.535 **
1135.606
76.214 ***
26.298
-9829.521 **
4028.877
1.770
1.315
0.014
0.109
0.031
0.046
14.730
147.125
0.213
0.398
237.470
383.919

-0.00004 **
0.00002
-721.951 ***
255.866
-2754.266 **
1112.880
76.742 ***
25.737
-9892.148 **
4015.734
2.310 *
1.256
0.027
0.103
0.029
0.049
67.132
145.963
0.245
0.400
286.270
383.635

410
0.651

410
0.656

***, **, * next to the mean indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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associated with firm risk in both models. This finding is significant at the 1% level in the
standard deviation of returns model and at the 5% level in the beta model. This provides
evidence for the theory that CEOs with SERPs manage their firms more conservatively in
order to ensure that a healthy firm exists upon retirement when the SERP is to be paid.
This is also evidence of Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) prediction that inside debt would
help to align the incentives of CEOs with debt holders. The control variables in the model
remain relatively unchanged once the SERP variable is added.
The second hypothesis predicts that the negative association between SERPs and
risk will be reduced when the payment of the SERP is sheltered in some form. To test this
hypothesis the SHELTER variable is added to the model and interacted with the SERP
variable. SHELTER is a binary variable that equals 1 when the SERP is sheltered.
RISK = β0 + β1SERP*SHELTER + β2SERP + β3SHELTER + β4LNASSETS + β5LEV +
β6MB + β7ROA + β8R&D + β9CAPEX + β10CASHCOMP +
β11LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES + β12VEGA + β13SEV+ ε
(2)
The second hypothesis is supported by the results presented in Table 6. The coefficient
for the interaction term (SERP*SHELTER) is positive and significant at the 1% level and
5% level for the standard deviation of returns and beta models, respectively. This
indicates that the SHELTER variable has a positive effect on the association between
SERP and firm risk. The SERP coefficient remains negative and highly significant
indicating that the negative relation between SERP and firm risk persists for SERPs
without SHELTERS. The joint test of SERP + SERP*SHELTER indicates that the
negative relation between SERPs and firm risk is drastically reduced in the returns model
(F-test is negative and significant at the 10% level) and eliminated in the beta model (Ftest is not significant) for SERPs with SHELTERs. These results indicate that SERPs will
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Table 6
Sheltered SERP Impact on Firm Risk
This table presents a cross section of OLS regression estimates of the standard deviation of returns and equal weighted
betas by firm. These dependent variables were estimated for the 2006 fiscal year. The dependent variables were
multiplied by 104 to improve the display of the estimates (Sundaram and Yermack 2007). SERP values were collected
from company proxy statements issued at the beginning of the 2007 fiscal year. SHELTER is a dichotomous variable
equal to 1 if the SERP is protected by a trust or alternative payment form. Industry is controlled for using Fama and
French industry groups. Standard errors are reported in italics. All regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity. SERP is
a continuous variable measuring the magnitude of the SERP. Leverage (LEV) is measured as total short and long term
debt divided by total long and short term debt plus total stockholders’ equity following Sundaram and Yermack (2007).
MB is a one year lag ratio of market value to book value. ROA is a one year lag of net income divided by total assets.
R&D and CAPEX represent a three year average of research and development and capital expenditures. CASHCOMP
is a three year average of cash plus bonus compensation. LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES measures CEO payperformance sensitivity and VEGA measures CEO pay sensitivity to stock return volatility. SEV is a binary variable
equal to 1 if the CEO has a severance package. Only firms with SERPs are included in the regression.
Dependent Variables

Standard Deviation
of Returns

SERP_SHELTER

0.0000798 ***
0.000028
-0.000100 ***
0.000026
-829.902
332.769
-754.935 ***
151.831
-787.443
849.134
55.945 ***
16.724
-11850.680 ***
2564.572
2.809 ***
0.835
-0.087
0.063
-0.039
0.032
74.720
101.789
0.906 ***
0.315
328.915
261.479

SERP
SHELTER
LNASSETS
LEV
MB
ROA
R&D
CAPEX
CASHCOMP
LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES
VEGA
SEV

SERP + SERP_SHELTER

-0.00002 *
0.00001

Observations
R2

410
0.617

Beta

0.000092 **
0.000044
-0.000107 ***
0.000039
-927.818 *
501.538
-693.651 ***
251.551
-2524.615 **
1120.017
72.281 ***
26.160
-9491.689 **
4049.565
1.968
1.239
0.017
0.100
0.022
0.049
65.550
146.659
0.205
0.390
244.953
379.283
-0.00001
0.00002
410
0.662

***, **, * next to the mean indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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not effectively reduce agency costs between CEOs and debt holders if the SERP is
sheltered.
The third hypothesis predicts that the interaction of a SERP and severance
agreement will attenuate the negative association between SERPs and firm risk. This
hypothesis is tested using the following model.
RISK = β0 + β1SERP*SEV + β2SERP + β3 SEV + β4LNASSETS + β5LEV + β6MB +
β7ROA + β8R&D + β9CAPEX + β10CASHCOMP + β11LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES +
β12VEGA + ε
(3)
The results are disclosed in Table 7. Unfortunately the results do not confirm hypothesis
3. The interaction term SERP*SEV is not significant. Furthermore, an F-test of the linear
combination (SERP+SERP*SEV) indicates that coefficient is statistically significant,
however the coefficient remains negative. This indicates that the severance agreement has
no impact on the relation between the SERP and firm risk. This is not surprising given
that in columns (1) and (3) of Table 5 SEV, as measured in this paper, does not appear to
have an association with risk. This may partly explain the lack of results in Table 7. I also
recognize that measuring severance as a binary variable hinders the power of the SEV
variable to capture some of the actual characteristics of a severance agreement. Further
exploration of severance agreements while interesting is beyond the scope of this paper.
The results of the analyses addressing hypothesis 2 call into question the use of
SERPs as tools to mitigate agency costs. While there is evidence that SERPs are
negatively associated with firm risk, this only holds if the SERP is structured like debt.
The SERP payment must be paid over time in some form of annuity to actually have a
negative association with risk.
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Table 7
SERP and Severance Interaction Effect on Firm Risk
This table presents a cross section of OLS regression estimates of the standard deviation of returns and equal weighted
betas by firm. These dependent variables were estimated for the 2006 fiscal year. The dependent variables were
multiplied by 104 to improve the display of the estimates (Sundaram and Yermack 2007). SERP values were collected
from company proxy statements issued at the beginning of the 2007 fiscal year. Industry is controlled for using Fama
and French industry groups. SEVERANCE is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a negotiated severance
agreement. A joint F-test of the interaction term is displayed below the table. Standard errors are reported in italics. All
regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity. SERP is a continuous variable measuring the magnitude of the SERP.
Leverage (LEV) is measured as total short and long term debt divided by total long and short term debt plus total
stockholders’ equity following Sundaram and Yermack (2007). MB is a one year lag ratio of market value to book
value. ROA is a one year lag of net income divided by total assets. R&D and CAPEX represent a three year average of
research and development and capital expenditures. CASHCOMP is a three year average of cash plus bonus
compensation. LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES measures CEO pay-performance sensitivity and VEGA measures CEO
pay sensitivity to stock return volatility. SEV is a binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a severance package.
Dependent Variables

Standard Deviation
of Returns

SERP_SEV

-0.0000005
0.000023
-0.000044 **
0.000019
366.921
314.343
-780.317 ***
155.329
-992.297
856.911
59.950 ***
16.248
-12220.850 ***
2571.763
3.109 ***
0.911
-0.077
0.066
-0.032
0.033

SERP
SEV
LNASSETS
LEV
MB
ROA
R&D
CAPEX
CASHCOMP
LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES

76.415
102.922
0.944 ***
0.319

VEGA

SERP + SERP_SEV

Observations
R2

Beta

-0.000015
0.000034
-0.000033
0.000026
384.728
458.478
-725.701 ***
256.156
-2743.043 **
1112.487
77.055 ***
25.825
-9893.838 **
4018.378
2.449 *
1.347
0.028
0.105
0.027
0.049
74.230
145.659
0.234
0.394

-0.00004 ***
0.00001

-0.00005 **
0.00002

410
0.607

410
0.657

***, **, * next to the mean indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Determinants of SERPs
Hypotheses 4-7 predict associations between compensation committee and other
corporate governance characteristics and SERPs. To test these hypotheses data was
gathered from proxy statements released at the time the CEO was hired for the same S&P
firms in the sample. SERP amounts are not like salary or option payments that are
negotiated or granted on an annual basis. SERP amounts are long-term in nature. While
minor provisions of the agreements may be amended from year to year, in most cases it is
likely that the decision to grant a SERP is made at the time a CEO is hired. It is for this
reason that corporate governance data was collected at the time of hire. This data was
supplemented with data obtained through Compustat and Execucomp. The following
probit model is used to test the hypotheses.
SERPBIN = β0 + β1ANNRET + β2EQUITY + β3CEO + β4BLOCK + β5CEOTENURE +
β6OUTSIDECEO + β7CEOAGE + β8BOARDSIZE + β9BOARDIND + β10LNASSETS +
β11LEV + ε
(4)
SERPBIN

= A binary variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO has a SERP
at the end of the 2006 fiscal year.

ANNRET

= Measures the magnitude of the annual retainer that is
paid to directors as part of their compensation.

EQUITY

= A binary variable equal to 1 if the directors receive some
form of equity as part of their compensation.

CEO

= Measures the percentage of compensation committee
members who have experience as a CEO.

BLOCK

= Count of the number of blockholders (>5% ownership of
the firm) within the company.

CEOTENURE

= The number of years the CEO has served in that position
for the current firm.
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OUTSIDECEO

= This is a binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO was hired
from outside the firm.

CEOAGE

= The 2006 age of the CEO.

BOARDSIZE

= The number of directors on the board.

BOARDIND

= The percentage of the board members that are
independent.

LNASSETS

= Natural log of assets at the end of the 2006 fiscal year.

LEV

= Based on Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and measured
as total debt (short and long term) divided by total debt plus
book value of equity.

The first four variables are the variables based on hypotheses 4-7. Based on the
prediction in hypothesis 4, I expect the coefficient on ANNRET to be positive. EQUITY
is a binary variable equal to 1 if the directors receive some form of equity as part of their
compensation. No directional prediction is made for this hypothesis. CEO measures the
percentage of CEOs who sit on the compensation committee. I expect the coefficient for
this variable to be positive. BLOCK measures the number of blockholders who own
greater than or equal to 5% of the firm. I do not make a directional prediction for this
hypothesis. CEOTENURE, OUTSIDECEO, LNASSETS, and LEV are variables taken
from Sundaram and Yermack’s (2007) determinants of SERP model. All of these
variables are expected to have positive coefficients. As CEO tenure increases then the
likelihood of having a form of compensation focused on retirement should also increase.
Firms may use SERPs to attract potential CEOs to the firm. This is controlled for by
using an indicator variable if the CEO was hired from outside of the firm. Size and
leverage have also been found to be positively correlated with the size of the SERP, thus
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it is possible that these variables are also positively correlated with the existence of a
SERP. BOARDSIZE, and BOARDIND are other common corporate governance
variables that have an impact on a firm’s internal corporate governance framework. The
size of the board also has implications for effective governance (Yermack 1996, Dalton et
al. 1999). Based on the results found by Conyon and He (2004) it appears that larger
boards are associated with lower CEO equity incentives. Prior research (Beasley 1996)
also supports the notion that boards with a greater proportion of independent directors are
more effective. BOARDIND is measured as the percentage of the board that is composed
of independent directors.
The results of the test are presented in Table 8. The sample size drops from 410 to
327. Data was gathered from proxy statements at the time of the CEO’s hire. The lost
observations can be attributed to those CEOs who were hired prior to 1994 as these older
proxies are very difficult to locate. Additional observations are lost during the estimation
of the probit model.12 The coefficient for ANNRET is positive as predicted but not
significant. The EQUITY variable is also not significant. However, the CEO variable
measuring the percentage of CEOs who serve on the compensation committee is positive
and significant at the 10% level. This provides evidence for hypothesis 6 that predicts
that a greater percentage of CEOs on the compensation committee will increase the
likelihood of having a SERP. This is one of the first findings indicating that the presence
of CEOs on compensation committee has effect on compensation. Earlier studies have
failed to find a link between CEO salary and options and CEOs serving on the
compensation committee.
12

Results hold using a logit model.
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Table 8
Determinants of a SERP
This table presents a cross section of Probit regression estimates of the likelihood of having a SERP by firm. The
dependent variable SERPBIN is equal to 1 if the CEO has a SERP during the 2006 fiscal year. SERP data were
collected from company proxy statements issued at the beginning of the 2007 fiscal year. Industry is controlled for
using the Fama and French industry groups. Standard errors are reported in italics. All regressions are robust to
heteroskedasticity. ANNRET is dollar amount of the annual retainer paid to directors. EQUITY is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the directors receive any form of equity compensation. CEO measures the percentage of the compensation
committee composed of CEOs. BLOCK is the number of blockhoders (>5% owners) of the firm. CEOTENURE
measures the number of years that the CEO has served in his/her current position. OUTSIDECEO equals 1 for a CEO
who was hired from outside the firm. CEOAGE measures the age of the CEO during 2006. BOARDSIZE measures the
number of board members who serve on the board. BOARDIND measures the percentage of board members who are
independent. LNASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage (LEV) is measured as total short and long
term debt divided by total long and short term debt plus total stockholders’ equity following Sundaram and Yermack
(2007).
Dependent Variable

SERPBIN

ANNRET

0.000
0.000

EQUITY

-0.072
0.210

CEO

0.551 *
0.324

BLOCK

0.009
0.023

CEOTENURE

0.019

OUTSIDECEO

-0.088

0.033
0.207
CEOAGE

0.040 **
0.017

BOARDSIZE

0.055
0.039

BOARDIND

0.466
0.662

LNASSETS

0.084
0.088

LEVERAGE

1.395 ***
0.463

Observations

327

Pseudo R2

0.287

***, **, * next to the mean indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.

42

CEOAGE and LEV are both positive and significant at the 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. This confirms Sundarum and Yermack’s (2007) results. While the results of
the determinant model do not provide evidence for all hypotheses, they do indicate that
CEO service on compensation committees affects pay.

Endogeneity of SERPs and Firm Risk
There is reason to believe that having a SERP is endogenously determined with
firm risk. While the focus of my paper is the impact of a SERP on CEO decision making
and firm risk, risk as a determinant of SERP must be considered. Directors at firms that
exhibit higher risk characteristics may decide to grant a SERP to a CEO to encourage a
long-term perspective, reduce agency costs, and moderate excessive risk taking. It is also
possible that CEOs require additional compensation to accept jobs at excessively risky
firms due to the loss of reputational capital if unsuccessful, or that boards choose to
compensate CEOs with SERPs when the firm or industry they are operating in is
inherently more risky than others. I address these concerns with two additional robustness
tests, a two-stage least squares (2sls) analysis and a true simultaneous equations analysis.
Using a standard OLS and ignoring the endogeneity issue will produce biased and
inconsistent estimators if endogeneity is actually present (Keshk 2003).
Two-Stage Least Squares Analysis

In the two stage model the endogenous variable SERP is regressed on the
exogenous variables in the first stage. Then in the second stage the predicted values are
used as a substitute for the endogenous variable (Keshk 2003). The exogenous variables
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in the first stage are composed of determinant variables. These variables include
instrumental variables that are correlated with the endogenous variable (SERP) and
uncorrelated with the error term. The variables for the first stage model are based on the
determinant model used to test hypotheses 4-7 in this paper.
While I do not re-test each hypothesis using 2sls, I have re-tested the first
hypothesis using this approach. If endogeneity is an issue, it is most likely an issue for the
test of the first hypothesis. The first hypothesis predicts, and OLS regressions supports,
that SERPs will be negatively associated with risk. To test this hypothesis in the OLS
setting I include all firms/CEOs in my sample – those who have SERPs and those who do
not. The endogenous tension arises in the OLS setting primarily because I may be
capturing a higher likelihood that “risky” firms choose to grant SERPs to their CEOs.
Table 9 presents the results of the 2sls regressions in columns (1) and (3) and the
results from the original ols regression in columns (2) and (4). The results in columns (2)
and (4) are copied from Table 5. All regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity. The
coefficients for SERP remain negative in both models and the statistical significance is
unchanged. The SERP coefficients in the 2sls models for both dependent variables are
more negative than in the ols model indicating that SERPs have an even greater negative
association with risk in the 2sls model than was found in the ols model. These results
corroborate the evidence presented by the ols models and help provide comfort that
endogeneity is not driving the results. I perform various post-estimation tests to validate
the 2sls model and instruments.
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Table 9
2SLS Estimation of SERP Impact on Firm Risk
This table presents the second stage results of a cross section of 2sls regression estimates of the standard deviation of
returns and equal weighted betas by firm. The ols regression results presented in Table 5 are included in columns (2)
and (4) for comparability. These dependent variables were estimated for the 2006 fiscal year. Industry is controlled for
using 1 digit SIC codes to avoid collinearity concerns. The dependent variables were multiplied by 104 to improve the
display of the estimates (Sundaram and Yermack 2007). SERP values were collected from company proxy statements
issued at the beginning of the 2007 fiscal year. Standard errors are reported in italics. All regressions are robust to
heteroskedasticity. SERP is a continuous variable measuring the magnitude of the SERP. Leverage (LEV) is measured
as total short and long term debt divided by total long and short term debt plus total stockholders’ equity following
Sundaram and Yermack (2007). MB is a one year lag ratio of market value to book value. ROA is a one year lag of net
income divided by total assets. R&D and CAPEX represent a three year average of research and development and
capital expenditures. CASHCOMP is a three year average of cash plus bonus compensation.
LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES measures CEO pay-performance sensitivity and VEGA measures CEO pay sensitivity
to stock return volatility. SEV is a binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a severance package.
Dependent Variables

Standard Deviation

Beta

of Returns
1

2

3

4

(2sls)

(ols)

(2sls)

(ols)

SERP

-0.00028 ***

LNASSETS

-248.534

0.00010

LEV

-0.00004 ***
0.00001
-780.190 ***

493.641

-1316.028

-992.675

-2015.043

925.283

855.186

1319.494

59.939 ***

23.289

16.181

ROA

-11414.390 ***

-12220.790 ***

3372.770

CAPEX
CASHCOMP
LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES
VEGA
SEV

Observations

2568.091

0.00002

-99.488

154.800

32.832

-0.00004 **

0.00014

341.980

MB

R&D

-0.00035 **

-721.951 ***
255.866
-2754.266 **
1112.880

25.599

76.742 ***

40.340
-10683.030 **

25.737
-9892.148 **

5246.166

4015.734

4.890

3.104 ***

2.607

2.310 *

3.465

0.863

5.240

1.256

0.214

-0.077

0.407

0.027

0.231

0.066

0.282

0.103

-0.098

-0.032

-0.034

0.029

0.074
241.596

0.033
76.176

0.114
392.422

0.049
67.132

181.097

102.355

294.047

145.963

-0.405

0.245

0.675

0.400

0.704

0.944 ***

0.459

0.322

684.819

363.602

98.908

286.270

461.605

264.027

686.954

383.635

361

401

360

401

***, **, * next to the mean indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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As previously mentioned, variables from the determinant model were evaluated as
potential instrument variables for the 2sls. While five variables (ANNRET, EQUITY,
CEO, BLOCK, and BOARDSIZE) were evaluated as potential instrument variables, two
variables were selected as the best instruments – BLOCK and BOARDSIZE. The two
director compensation variables ANNRET and EQUITY failed to show any correlation
with the potentially endogenous variable SERP. The remaining variables CEO, BLOCK,
and BOARDSIZE are all highly significant in the first stage of the model indicating the
necessary correlation with SERP. The results are qualitatively unchanged using all three
as instruments. I do not have any reason to believe that the three remaining instruments
are correlated with the error term; however, post-estimation tests indicate that CEO may
be related to the error term making the instrument semi-endogenous. Thus, BLOCK and
BOARDSIZE were used to instrument for SERP. The results of the first stage regression,
not tabulated, indicate that the two instruments chosen for SERP are highly correlated
with the SERP. This satisfies the first condition that the instrumental variables be
correlated with the endogenous variable. Furthermore, the F-statisitic is 14.42. Staiger
and Stock (1997) believe that an F-statistic below 10 is cause for concern. The F-statistic
of 14.42 clearly exceeds this threshold. To evaluate the identification of the equation, I
calculate the Anderson canonical correlation statistic. I reject the null hypothesis at the
1% level indicating that the instruments have properly identified the equation (Baum
2006). I have used two instrumental variables to instrument for my one endogenous
variable making the equation overidentified. This allows me to perform an
overidentification test that will indicate whether or not the instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term (Wooldridge 2010). The Hansen J-statistic is calculated to test the
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overidentification of all instruments. The null is not rejected with a p-value=.2717
indicating that that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term (Wooldridge
2010). These tests provide strong evidence that the instruments chosen are sufficient and
that the model is properly identified. Furthermore, I employed Generalized Methods of
Moments (GMM) estimation and found the results qualitatively unchanged. The results
are not tabulated for the sake of brevity.
Although the magnitude of the coefficient estimates changed in the two stage
model, the direction and significance of the coefficient estimates remains qualitatively
unchanged. Furthermore, the effect of the SERP on risk in both two stage models was
larger than in the ols model. It appears that any impact that endogeneity may have on the
original ols estimates only understates the association between SERPs and risk.
Simultaneous Equations Analysis

The 2sls estimation discussed above provides consistent estimators; however,
there is always concern that the estimators are not efficient using 2sls (Larcker and
Rusticus 2010). To address this concern I employ a simultaneous equations model that
simultaneously estimates a probit model of SERP and an ols model of firm risk in the
first stage. The predicted values of each variable (SERP and firm risk) are used as
explanatory variables in the second stage of the simultaneous equations. The standard
errors are adjusted in a final stage. This follows the approach by Graham and Rogers
(2002), Bebchuck et al. (2009), and Fauver and Naranjo (2010). By adjusting the
standard errors in a final stage, the model produces more efficient estimates than the 2sls
model. The specific model specification that I am working with requires that SERP be
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measured as a binary variable in order for the probit model to function correctly.
SERPBIN equals 1 if the CEO has a SERP and 0 otherwise. My first hypothesis tested
the association between SERP size (SERP measured as a continuous variable) and firm
risk. Because I have not yet specifically tested the relation between the existence of a
SERP and firm risk, I first re-estimate equation one substituting SERPBIN for SERP.
This allows me to directly compare the results of the simultaneous equations model with
the ols specification.
RISK = β0 + β1SERPBIN + β2 LNASSETS + β3 LEV + β4MB + β5ROA + β6R&D +
β7CAPEX + β8CASHCOMP + β9LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES + β10VEGA + β11SEV+
ε
(5)
In Table 10 I only disclose the final result of the simultaneous equations model
with corrected standard errors in columns (1) and (3). The results from equation (5) using
SERPBIN as opposed to SERP are disclosed in columns (2) and (4). The coefficient for
SERPBIN in the standard ols model indicates a negative and significant (at the 1% level)
relation between having a SERP and firm risk for both firm risk models, consistent with
prior findings. The simultaneous equations estimates for SERPBIN are also negative and
significant (at the 1% level). The results of the simultaneous equations model combined
with the results from the 2sls model provide strong assurance that endogeneity is not
driving the results.
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Table 10
Simultaneous Equations Estimation of SERP Impact on Firm Risk
This table presents the final stage results of a cross section of simultaneous equations regression estimates of the
standard deviation of returns and equal weighted betas by firm in columns (1) and (3), respectively. Columns (2) and
(4) present ols regression results using SERPBIN for comparability. These dependent variables were estimated for the
2006 fiscal year. Industry is controlled for using 1 digit SIC codes to avoid collinearity concerns. The dependent
variables were multiplied by 104 to improve the display of the estimates (Sundaram and Yermack 2007). SERPBIN
equals 1 if the CEO has a SERP. This information was collected from company proxy statements issued at the
beginning of the 2007 fiscal year. Standard errors are reported in italics. All regressions are robust to
heteroskedasticity. Leverage (LEV) is measured as total short and long term debt divided by total long and short term
debt plus total stockholders’ equity following Sundaram and Yermack (2007). MB is a one year lag ratio of market
value to book value. ROA is a one year lag of net income divided by total assets. R&D and CAPEX represent a three
year average of research and development and capital expenditures. CASHCOMP is a three year average of cash plus
bonus compensation. LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES measures CEO pay-performance sensitivity and VEGA measures
CEO pay sensitivity to stock return volatility. SEV is a binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a severance package.
Dependent Variables

SERPBIN
LNASSETS
LEV
MB
ROA
R&D
CAPEX
CASHCOMP
LNPORTFOLIOINCENTIVES
VEGA
SEV

Observations

Standard Deviation
of Returns
1
2
(Simultaneous
Equations)
(ols)
-685.275 ***
-1009.714 ***
164.152
291.523
-738.414 ***
-903.151 ***
94.610
153.257
-908.929 **
-1763.446 **
383.061
740.103
32.915 ***
38.152 *
11.852
21.117
-10637.640 *** -11129.920 ***
1315.952
2755.134
1.668 ***
1.728 ***
0.501
0.636
0.088 *
0.129
0.046
0.100
-0.005
-0.034
0.033
0.028
-10.524
46.850
55.206
109.010
0.384 *
0.500
0.224
0.332
191.257
-4.671
141.502
279.288
360

410

Beta
3
(Simultaneous
Equations)
-922.980 ***
251.333
-722.409 ***
154.817
-1255.304 **
620.084
22.036
19.047
-9412.620 ***
2184.815
-1.515 *
0.852
0.244 ***
0.076
0.087
0.054
82.336
94.539
-0.836 **
0.361
-527.285 **
233.067

4
(ols)
-1246.244 ***
438.126
-925.586 ***
239.936
-2296.150 **
1100.681
16.983
41.358
-6624.293
4554.243
-1.224
1.437
0.309 **
0.129
0.027
0.051
78.827
173.232
-0.527
0.411
-519.240
468.914

360

***, **, * next to the mean indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The challenge still exists for corporations to properly align management
incentives with stakeholder incentives. Traditionally, maximizing shareholder returns has
been discussed in the literature. More recently, concern has shifted from understanding
pay-performance sensitivity to pay-risk sensitivity (SEC 2009). The vast majority of
compensation research in accounting and finance has focused on annual compensation
agreements. Annual salaries and equity incentives are very important in determining
executive incentives; however, CEO SERPs must not be ignored. It is important that we
understand the effect that these large SERPs have on firm risk.
My paper provides evidence that certain SERPs are negatively associated with
firm risk and may reduce the agency costs of debt. However, if these SERP payments are
sheltered by the firm then the negative association with risk is greatly reduced and even
eliminated in some specifications. These findings are limited to the largest public
companies in the US and may not be generalizable to all public companies. Future
research will be required to make this determination.
As regulators, investors, and others in society debate the form, size, and structure
of executive compensation these findings should be considered. While large in size, if
structured correctly SERPs may help curb the excessive risk taking that many
stakeholders believe to be an issue in the current economy. If the SERP arrangements are
structured incorrectly, then the benefits of the SERP seem to dissipate.
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SERP SHELTERING
Rights of Withdrawal
Because SERPs are subject to the volatility of the firm and are not protected by
the same provisions as other retirement accounts, a CEO may maximize expected wealth
by protecting the SERP. There are three basic levels of securing payment of the SERP.
The first way to increase the security of payment is by defining rights of withdrawal.
CEOs and companies may negotiate conditions that would give rise to an early
withdrawal. To avoid immediate taxation, the early withdrawal clause must include a
triggering event. Otherwise the CEO would be subject to taxation even before any
withdrawal. A common form of the right of withdrawal is change of control agreement.
The majority of CEOs have agreements in place that guarantee certain payments if their
firm experiences a change of control.13

Rabbi Trust
The second layer of security for the SERP is securing the assets through a trust
such as a Rabbi Trust. A company could contribute funds to the trust to be used for the
sole purpose of funding the SERP. For the CEO to avoid immediate taxation on the
amounts contributed to the trust, the trust must be available to the company’s creditors in
the event of bankruptcy.

13

A change of control is defined as an event where a transfer of firm ownership occurs in which a person,
group, or other entity obtains a fifty percent or more ownership stake in the firm. Executive compensation
and severance agreements are generally written to provide compensation for an executive who is
terminated because of a change of control.
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Secular Trust
The third layer of security as described by Kennedy for a SERP is a secular trust.
A secular trust is a fully funded trust that is not available to the company’s creditors in
the event of bankruptcy. This type of agreement creates a fully funded pension for the
executive. This creates an immediate tax liability for the CEO; however, in some
instances CEO pay is grossed up for the amount of the tax liability (Gerakos 2007). This
would offset any negative consequences of a secular trust for the executive.
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